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Abstract 
In the article titled Rehabilitation: A Proposal for a Climate Compensation Mecha-
nism for Small Island States, Professor Maxine Burkett exhaustively unpacks some 
of the most fundamental climate-induced slow-onset events and concerns facing the 
Alliance of Small Island States (AOSIS).  Burkett proposes a compensation and re-
habilitation mechanism to address damage and loss to small island states due to 
slow-onset events.  Using Caribbean AOSIS states as primary examples, Burkett’s 
insightful paper provides a thorough and sustained argument on the rationale for a 
compensation and rehabilitation mechanism as well as a framework for implement-
ing such mechanism at the international level.  
This response paper examines the potential and paradoxes of the compensation and 
rehabilitation proposal, with a focus on some practical questions that a Compensa-
tion and Rehabilitation Commission (CRC) may face along the way.  It starts by 
providing further statistics on the dual vulnerabilities of AOSIS states in Africa 
that lend credence to Burkett’s arguments that the vulnerabilities of many AOSIS 
states call for global responses that go beyond disaster risk reduction and manage-
ment and risk transfer, to focus more on providing a robust package of compensa-
tion and rehabilitation through a CRC.  It then discusses four key practical ques-
tions that must be further examined to fine-tune the CRC proposal.  They are 
epistemic questions, floodgate question, institutional proliferation, and accountabil-
ity questions. 
I. Introduction 
With emerging signs of temperature change all over the world, it is now 
widely accepted that climate change is real—that human emissions of 
greenhouse gases are a cause; that if left unchecked, climate change may lead to 
extreme weather events such as droughts and flooding; that it may threaten 
food security; and that it may lead to ill health and economic decline in nations 
of the world.1  Climate change, however, poses even more serious economic, 
social, and environmental threats to small island states—arguably, more so 
than any other group in the world.  Apart from the unique geographical 
vulnerabilities of small island states which contribute to their low adaptive 
 
1. James Hansen, Defusing the Global Warming Time Bomb, 3 SCI. AM. 68, 68-77 (2004). See also 
Margot Wallstrom, Meeting the Long Term Challenge of Global Warming: A European 
Perspective, in CLIMATE POLICY FOR THE 21ST CENTURY: MEETING THE LONG-TERM CHALLENGE OF 
GLOBAL WARMING 17, 17-25 (David Michel ed., Ctr. for Transatlantic Rel. 2003); Geoffrey Lean, 
Why Antarctica Will Soon Be the Only Place to Live—Literally, THE INDEP., May 2, 2004, available 
at http://www.independent.co.uk/environment/why-antarctica-will-soon-be-the-ionlyi-place-to-live-
-literally-58574.html. 
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capacity, AOSIS includes African Islands such as Cape Verde, Guinea-Bissau, 
and Mauritius, countries that have dual vulnerability to climate change—both 
as arid countries in the Sahel region and as impoverished small island states.2  
For example, even without climate change, Sahelian islands are currently 
subjected to tough arid conditions, which typically make farming and 
agriculture difficult and near impossible.3  A region is classified as arid if it is 
characterized by a severe lack of available water, to the extent of hindering or 
preventing the growth and development of plant and animal life.4  Such climate 
change would only escalate these pre-existing conditions, thereby intensifying 
the cycle of food shortage, water scarcity, and the spread of diseases in Sahelian 
African States.5  
Secondly, the underwhelming economic and social conditions typical of many 
AOSIS states are even more severe in Africa, where some of the world’s poorest 
people live; arguably, more severe than the Caribbean countries which Professor 
Burkett discussed.  Cape Verde, for example, reveals statistics and figures that 
are even more alarming than those adduced by Burkett, and which further 
reinforce the importance of a compensation and rehabilitation process for the 
highly vulnerable residents of small island states.  Cape Verde is a tiny island 
350 miles off the coast of Senegal in West Africa with a population of 491,875—
essentially, tiny when compared to the State of California alone (which has 38 
million people) or when compared to the United State of America’s 313 million 
people.  Eighty percent of Cape Verde’s population lives in the coastal zone.6  
 
2. The name “Sahel” is derived from the Arabic word sahil, which means “border of the desert.”  
The Sahel region covers nine countries: Mauritania, Senegal, the Gambia, Guinea-Bissau, 
Mali, Burkina Faso, Niger, Chad, and Cape Verde. It has a total area of 5.4 million km2 and a 
population of almost 60 million. See Keffing Sissoko et al., Agriculture, Livelihoods & Climate 
Change in the West African Sahel, 11 REGIONAL ENVT’L CHANGE S119, S119-25 (Supp. 2010); 
Adrian Chappell & Clive T. Agnew, Modelling Climate Change in West African Sahel Rainfall 
(1931–90) as an Artifact of Changing Station Locations, 24 INT’L J. CLIMATOLOGY 547, 547-54 
(2004). 
3. A. Ben Mohamed, N. van Duivenbooden & S. Abdoussallam, Impact of Climate Change on 
Agricultural Production in the Sahel—Part 1. Methodological Approach and Case Study for 
Millet in Niger, 54 CLIMATIC CHANGE 327, 327-48 (2002). 
4. Water is a scarce resource in all Sahel countries. Besides erratic rainfall patterns, poor soils 
and unfavourable socioeconomic conditions are key constraints to agricultural development in 
Sahelian states. See H. P. Bailey, Semi-Arid Climates: Their Definition and Distribution, in 
AGRICULTURE IN SEMIARID ENVIRONMENTS 73, 73-97 (Anthony E. Hall, Glenn H. Cannel & 
Harry W. Lawton eds., 1979); A.J. Dietz, R. Ruben & Jan Verhagen, The Impact of Climate 
Change on Drylands With a Focus on West Africa, 39 ENV’T & POL’Y 465 (2001), available at 
http://www.researchgate.net/publication/40143328_Impact_of_climate_change_on_drylands_w
ith_a_focus_on_West_Africa. 
5. Chris Huntingford et al., Aspects of Climate Change Prediction Relevant to Crop Productivity, 
360 PHIL. TRANSACTIONS OF THE ROYAL SOC’Y BIO. SCI. 1999, 2000-01 (2005). 
6. The World Factbook: Cabo Verde, CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY, https://www.cia.gov/library/ 
publications/the-world-factbook/geos/cv.html (last visited Sept. 9, 2014); GOV’T OF CAPE VERDE, 
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Many houses are constructed with non-resistant wood materials that are 
vulnerable to coastal hazards and sea-level rise, while about 75% of food must 
be imported.  Cape Verde annually runs a high trade deficit, financed by foreign 
aid and remittances from emigrants, where remittances constitute a supplement 
to the Gross Domestic Product (GDP) of more than 20%.  At present, nearly half 
of the population lacks access to a public water supply and over half lacks access 
in rural areas.  With a 30% unemployment rate (compared to the United States’ 
6%) and a GDP per capita of $3,900 (compared to the United States’ $52,000), 
Cape Verde is currently in dire economic conditions.  
The service sector has been the main engine of growth in Cape Verde, 
accounting for over 70% of GDP, with over 21% of GDP (and over 80% of foreign 
direct investment) from tourism alone.7  Tourist facilities are concentrated in 
the coastal zone of low-lying islands, such as Sal and Boavista, and are 
vulnerable to sea-level rise and coastal hazards.  Beaches—on which the 
industry depends—are threatened by sea-level rise and sand extraction.  
Increased climatic pressure and flooding from climate change may affect tourist 
facilities in Cape Verde’s coastal zones, consequently shutting down Cape 
Verde’s principal source of revenue. 
Due to both vulnerabilities, Cape Verde has been ranked the eighth most 
endangered nation on earth as a result of flooding from climate change.8  An 
additional strain on Cape Verde—due to climate change—may literarily shut 
down the entire country.  With more scientific and technical expositions of the 
unique vulnerabilities of climate change in countries such as Cape Verde, there 
seems to be an emerging consensus that the negative effects of slow-onset events 
are already affecting AOSIS states, and there is a need for appropriate, 
sustainable financial instruments for addressing loss and damage associated 
with slow-onset events.  Despite this growing awareness and consensus, the 
question of ‘how’ has yet to attain the desired level of scholarly agreement and 
articulation.  That is, what is the appropriate legal and policy framework 
through which sustainable financial instruments appropriate for addressing loss 
and damage associated with slow-onset events may be provided for AOSIS 
states? 
 
CLIMATE CHANGE VULNERABILITY ASSESSMENT OF CAPE VERDE–SUMMARY FOR POLICY MAKERS 9, 
11 (2012), available at http://www.unep.org/dewa/Portals/67/pdf/SPM-CAPE-VERDE.pdf. 
7. GOV’T OF CAPE VERDE, supra note 6, at 11.  
8. See Sven HARMELING & DAVID ECKSTEIN, GERMANWATCH, GLOBAL CLIMATE RISK INDEX 2013, 
19, 24 (2013), available at http://germanwatch.org/fr/download/7170.pdf; BRIGIDA ROCHA 
BRITO ET AL., TURISMO EM MEIO INSULAR AFRICANO: POTENCIALIDADES, CONSTRANGIMENTOS E 
IMPACTOS (2010). 
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Many of the previous policy prescriptions focus only on one aspect of AOSIS' 
original proposal to the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate 
Change (UNFCCC)—an insurance mechanism, through which they can access 
funds immediately after a disaster.9  Furthermore, while AOSIS’s proposal also 
contained the two-pronged aspects of disaster risk management and 
compensation and rehabilitation, the disaster risk management aspect has 
received more favorable articulation than the compensation and rehabilitation 
component.  Burkett rightly adduces this to the prevailing attitude of 
pessimism, lack of political will, and explicit rejection of any measure that might 
vaguely resemble climate-related reparations.  Through her paper, Burkett has 
made one of the strongest arguments for the need for attitudinal change and 
reconsideration. 
The current reality in small island states such as Cape Verde lends credence 
to Burkett’s views that there is a need to establish a compensation and 
rehabilitation commission (CRC) under the UNFCCC, through which small 
island states can be adequately compensated and rehabilitated for slow-onset 
events.  The key aim of the CRC would be to disburse monies from a global pool 
to rehabilitate individuals, communities, and countries affected by slow-onset 
events, such as sea level rise, increasing temperatures, ocean acidification, 
glacial retreat and related impacts, salinization, land and forest degradation, 
and loss of biodiversity and desertification.10  Burkett’s proposal on how the 
compensation and rehabilitation mechanism may be structured is undoubtedly 
thorough and convincing.  
However, considering the level of scrutiny and review such a proposal would 
have to go through at the international level, certain questions arise from 
Burkett's proposal that call for more thoughts.  To provoke attitudinal change in 
this area, practical questions that may stifle the workability of the CRC must be 
anticipated and thoroughly addressed to ensure that the proposal is not stripped 
of its radical promise.  Adopting McGovern’s framework on the eight initial 
variables that must be considered in designing a claims resolution process, the 
four key issues discussed here fall under organization and implementation, 
damage methodology, and compensation.11 
 
9.  Alliance of Small Island States (AOSIS), Proposal to the AWG-LCA: Multi-Window 
Mechanism to Address Loss and Damage from Climate Change Impacts (2008), available at 
http://unfccc.int/files/kyoto_protocol/application/pdf/aosisinsurance061208.pdf. 
10. U. N. Framework Convention on Climate Change, Cancun, Mex., Nov. 29-Dec.10, 2010, Report of 
the Conference of the Parties on its Sixteenth Session, ¶ 25, U.N. Doc. FCCC/CP/2010/7/Add.1 
(Mar. 15, 2011). 
11. See Francis E. McGovern, The What and Why of Claims Resolution Facilities, 57 STAN. L. REV. 
1361 (2005). 
13 SANTA CLARA JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 133 (2015) 
138 
II.  Strengthening the CRC: Some Thoughts 
Despite the promise of the CRC as a holistic framework for addressing loss 
and damage by rehabilitating individuals, communities, and countries affected 
by slow-onset events, there are a number of concerns on the practicality of 
implementing the CRC framework.  They include epistemic questions, floodgate 
question, institutional proliferation, and accountability questions. 
A. Epistemic Questions 
Epistemic concerns include questions on whether climate change 
administrators within the UNFCCC system have the requisite capacity to 
implement such a compensatory mechanism.  An epistemic community has been 
defined as a network of professionals with recognized expertise in a particular 
domain and an authoritative claim to knowledge within that domain.  They 
have a shared set of normative and causal beliefs, shared notions of validity, 
and a common policy enterprise.12  The United Nations Development 
Programme (UNDP) defines capacity as the ability of individuals, institutions, 
and societies to perform functions, solve problems, and set and achieve 
objectives in a sustainable manner.13  Adopting this definition, the question is 
whether the UNFCCC has the capacity and resources to support the quasi-
judicial functions, particularly the technical fact-finding aspect of the work, of a 
CRC.  There have been increased arguments that the interpretation and 
application of international obligations should be concentrated in bodies whose 
primary function is claim adjudication, and that it is dangerous to place the 
function of interpreting claims in the hands of professional administrators.14  
Determining the appropriate level of compensation and rehabilitation and 
monies to disburse to a country based on its filed claims undoubtedly requires 
some degree of fact finding—ascertaining the claims and providing a final 
funding decision based on the appraisal of the claims—that is typical of the role 
of a common law judge or arbiter in determining the quantum of compensatory 
 
12. Jorge Daniel Taillant, Founder, Ctr. for Hum. Rts. and Env’t (CEDHA), Presentation at the 
U.N. Hum. Rts. Council Seminar to Address the Adverse Impacts of Climate Change on the 
Full Enjoyment of Hum. Rts., Session 3: Forging Stronger Cooperation Between Human 
Rights and Climate Change Communities (Feb. 2012), available at http://www.ohchr.org/ 
Documents/Issues/ClimateChange/Seminar2012/DanielTaillant24Feb2012.pdf; Christopher 
McCrudden, Mainstreaming Equality in Northern Ireland 1998-2004: A Review of Issues 
Concerning the Operation of the Equality Duty in Sec. 75 of the Northern Ireland Act 1998, in 
2 SECTION 75 EQUALITY DUTY: AN OPERATIONAL REVIEW 52-76 (Eithne McLaughlin & Neil 
Faris eds., 2004).  
13. CARLOS LOPES & THOMAS THEISOHN, OWNERSHIP, LEADERSHIP & TRANSFORMATION: CAN WE 
DO BETTER FOR CAPACITY DEVELOPMENT? 1 (2003).  
14. See generally McCrudden, supra note 12.  
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damages sufficient in amount to indemnify the injured person for the loss 
suffered.  Ascribing a monetary amount to the climate change loss a country has 
suffered—whether this loss is due to direct impacts of slow-onset events, a loss 
of revenue, loss of culture and tradition, emotional loss or the loss of a financial 
opportunity—can never be a straightforward exercise.  Failure to get it right 
may result in insufficient compensation or in a windfall, both of which will be 
detrimental to the ultimate goals of the CRC. 
This difficulty in getting it right is often exacerbated when, as is often the 
case with climate change, the line between causation and damages is unclear.  
As Vaughan Williams L.J. advised in the seminal case of Chaplin v. Hicks, “The 
fact that damages cannot be assessed with certainty does not relieve the 
wrongdoer of the necessity of paying damages."15 However, in such situations 
the highest level of skill and experience is required to ensure that the correct 
test is applied for each element of the inquiry.  As noted in the English case of 
Allied Maples Grp. v. Simmons & Simmons, it is necessary to establish “where 
causation ends and quantification of damage begins.”16  
The nature of claims associated with climate-induced losses will require a 
great deal of skill and competence to establish a clear link between climate 
change and damages resulting from slow-onset events.  Some of the damages 
adduced to slow-onset events may in fact be attributed to other causes not 
covered by the UNFCCC framework.17  The question, therefore, is whether 
professional administrators within the UNFCCC have the required epistemic 
expertise to consider such questions that may arise with respect to causation 
and damage quantification. 
More importantly, where the loss is contingent on uncertain future events, 
the CRC would be faced with a challenge that requires a real exercise of its 
discretion and skill.  Assessing damages may be further complicated if there is 
uncertainty as to whether a future event that will cause loss to the claimant will 
materialize at all.  For example, if a small island state is claiming damages for 
the possibility of losing its revenue from tourism due to climate change,—there 
is only a chance of this occurring, as it is a future occurrence the certainty of 
which cannot be ascertained—providing compensatory damages for such claims 
would require a high-level consideration of this contingency and its likely 
 
15. Chaplain v. Hicks, [1911] A.C. 788 (Eng.). 
16. Allied Maples Grp. Ltd. v. Simmons & Simmons, [1999] A.C. 1602 (Eng.). 
17. For example, some of the critics of the science on slow-onset events and climate change 
attribute some of the problems to natural causes. See, e.g., Bob Ellis & Syun Akasogu, Climate 
Change: Science Manipulated - Natural Causes of Global Warming are Much More Significant 
than Man-Made Changes, CLIMATE REALISTS (June 3, 2009, 5:46 AM), 
http://climaterealists.com/index.php?id=3524. 
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impacts.  Traditionally, courts deal with such situations by factoring in a 
contingency allowance.  This contingency is incorporated into the damages 
calculations by means of a percentage figure that represents the percentage 
chance of the event materializing.  As held by Lord Diplock in Mallett v. 
McMonagle, the court must make an estimate as to the chances that the 
particular thing will or would have happened and reflect those chances, and 
whether they are more or less than even in the amount of damages which it 
awards.18  Thus, factors such as life expectancy, likelihood of earnings and 
revenue, the likelihood of a disease developing, or the possibility of future 
infrastructural collapse are accounted for in percentage terms estimated by the 
court.  The question, however, is how effective this approach is in reality.  As is 
often pointed out by experts testifying before the court as to the quantification of 
damages, in science and medicine an event either materializes or it does not.  
Accordingly, a plaintiff may develop a terminal disease and die, or a plaintiff 
may live ailment-free to a venerable age.  Awarding damages on a percentage 
contingency basis seems to under-compensate the plaintiff in the former 
instance and unfairly reward the plaintiff for a loss it never incurred in the 
latter scenario.  Without the gift of prophetic foresight, the CRC would have no 
way of knowing for a certainty that a future climatic event, which is the subject 
of a compensatory claim will or will not materialize.  Typically, a court may 
address the case of uncertainty by providing a claimant with the most equitable 
measure of damages it is able to derive from the facts before it.  This 
undoubtedly requires a level of skill and competence to be able to determine the 
most equitable compensation based on the circumstances surrounding each and 
every claim.  This also goes to the question of whether a CRC composed of 
professional administrators would have the required level of skill to determine 
the equitable compensation for claims based on future events.  
The CRC proposal must therefore be re-examined to determine whether 
outsiders to the workings of international law adjudication have the capacity 
and skills to fully implement such compensatory mechanisms.  The question to 
ask is whether climate change administrators possess the requisite skill, 
training, competence, and experience to appraise technical claims for 
compensation due to climate change impacts, some of which touch on several 
international law treaties. 
 
18. Mallet v. McMonagle, [1970] H.L. 166 (N.I.). 
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B. Floodgate Question 
This question goes directly to the donor fatigue issue raised by Burkett.  
However, it looks at the issue from a slightly different angle.  Here, we ask 
whether establishing a separate compensation and rehabilitation mechanism for 
AOSIS states will open a floodgate of similar claims from other non-AOSIS 
developing countries, particularly African states, which also have strong claims 
based on the negative social, environmental, and economic impacts of climate 
change in their regions.  Many followers of the climate change negotiations will 
agree, for example, that Africa’s climate change diplomacy is strongly 
underpinned by a notion of entitlement to compensation, funding, technology 
transfer, and adaptation assistance from industrialized countries that bear 
historical responsibilities for the cause of climate change.  For example, during 
the negotiations of the Kyoto Protocol, African countries pushed for a "fair deal," 
which included the recognition of climate change as a problem created by 
industrialized countries, and which can and should only be resolved by the same 
industrialized countries, who have the capacity and resources to do so.  Thus, 
the crux of the African proposal centered on common but differentiated 
responsibilities, technology transfer, financial assistance, special circumstance, 
and poverty recognition through flexible mechanisms.  This perception remains 
the same today.  As such, if a CRC for AOSIS states were to be approved to 
disburse monies from a global pool to rehabilitate individuals, communities, and 
countries affected by slow-onset events, there are real chances that African 
countries and other non-AOSIS states may push for such recognition through a 
separate fund or a CRC for African states.  An argument may be made that the 
claims of AOSIS, though unique, are not more troubling than the fears, 
concerns, and realities in African countries, such as Sudan (threatened by 
drought and flood) or Nigeria’s Niger Delta region, which is typically a coastal 
zone increasingly facing climate-induced threats and forced migration patterns.  
If an international climate change regime were to establish such additional 
funds, donors to these global pools may feel overwhelmed by the number of 
requests to provide funding support for climate change compensation and 
rehabilitation.  In other words, this could further heighten the donor fatigue 
concern highlighted in current international climate change efforts.  One way of 
navigating this concern is to suggest that the CRC proposed by Professor 
Burkett should not be limited to AOSIS states alone.  This, however, raises the 
question of whether there is sufficient global funding to support such a global 
pool of compensation for all countries facing slow-onset events and climate 
threats, and whether the CRC would have the institutional capacity to 
accommodate claims from all climate change affected regions of the world. 
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C. Institutional Proliferation (Too Many Institutions) 
Closely intertwined with the question of how to address compensation and 
rehabilitation claims from non-AOSIS states is the question of whether 
establishing the CRC would result in the duplication of roles currently played by 
a number of climate change institutions, and whether it would bring about 
institutional proliferation, which has been identified as a chief cause of the lack 
of systemic integration, coherence, and harmony in international law.19  
Creating new institutions comes with high costs and administrative 
requirements—for example, the expansion of current institutions or the cost of 
staffing, training, and program funding.  This is why the United Nations 
advocates an approach that builds on existing capacities and resources as 
opposed to the proliferation of new institutions.20  
This raises the question of why a new stand-alone CRC should be established, 
and whether, for example, the enforcement branch of the Kyoto Compliance 
Mechanism is not able to perform these functions.  The Compliance Committee 
is made up of two branches: a facilitative branch and an enforcement branch.21  
The facilitative branch provides advice and assistance to parties to promote 
their compliance and implementation of the Protocol.  The enforcement branch 
is responsible for determining the consequences for parties not meeting their 
commitments.22  The enforcement branch is responsible for determining 
whether a party included in Annex I (an “Annex I Party”) is not in compliance 
with its emissions targets, the methodological and reporting requirements for 
 
19. For the debate on fragmentation of international law regimes and institutions, see Joel P. 
Trachtman, Fragmentation, Coherence and Synergy in International Law, 2 TRANSNAT’L LEGAL 
THEORY 505, 505-36 (2011). As Outi Korhonen puts it, it is a question on “how a synthetic order, 
which is both common enough to produce cohesion and pluralistic enough not to reduce the 
various cultural differences, can be achieved without succumbing to either hegemony or 
unmanageable fragmentation.” OUTI KORHONEN, INTERNATIONAL LAW SITUATED: AN ANALYSIS OF 
THE LAWYER'S STANCE TOWARDS CULTURE, HISTORY AND COMMUNITY 42 (2000). See also Dirk 
Pulkowski, Narratives of Fragmentation International Law between Unity and Multiplicity, EUR. 
SOC’Y INT’L L. 1 (2005) (presented at the ESIL Founding Conference in Florence), available at 
http://www.esil-sedi.eu/sites/default/files/Pulkowski_0.PDF; Rep. of the Int'l Law Comm'n, 58th 
Sess., May 1-June 9, July 3-Aug. 11, 2006, U.N. Doc. A/CN.4/ L.682 (Apr. 13 2006).  
20. The Human Rights Based Approach to Development Cooperation Towards a Common 
Understanding Among UN Agencies ,  UN I T E D NA T IO N S DE V.  GR O U P  (2003), 
http://www.undg.org/archive_docs/6959-The_Human_Rights_Based_Approach_to_Development_  
 Cooperation_Towards_a_Common_Understanding_among_UN.pdf. 
21. An Introduction to the Kyoto Protocol Compliance Mechanism, U. N. FRAMEWORK CONVENTION ON 
CLIMATE CHANGE, http://unfccc.int/kyoto_protocol/compliance/items/3024.php (last visited Jan. 3, 
2015). 
22. Both branches are composed of 10 members, including one representative from each of the 
five official UN regions (Africa, Asia, Latin America and the Caribbean, Central and Eastern 
Europe, and Western Europe and Others), one from the small island developing States, and 
two each from Annex I and non-Annex I Parties. Id. 
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greenhouse gas inventories, and the eligibility requirements under the 
mechanism.  It is simply the “watch dog” for non-compliance.  Unlike the 
Aarhus Convention, the Kyoto Protocol does not currently have any formal 
compliance mechanism for private individuals and NGOs, whose interests or 
rights are violated under the UNFCCC.23  Consequently, instead of establishing 
a CRC, a slight institutional adjustment could be made by establishing a third 
branch, the Public Complaints Branch, that can holistically address 
compensation and rehabilitation claims such as this from all regions.  This 
arguably avoids the exorbitant costs in terms of structure and resources for 
creating a single CRC for AOSIS states.  It also builds on existing capacities and 
resources. 
Similarly, Professor Maxine's proposal places the fact-finding functions of the 
CRC in the hands of Commissioners, who she notes, will be saddled with 
investigating claims and complaints.  An argument can also be made that the 
fact-finding functions can be placed within the mandate of the current Expert 
Review Teams (ERTs) of the UNFCCC, an international team of experts that 
review emission reduction inventories, reports, and methodologies submitted to 
Parties to ensure accuracy.  Arguably, the mandate and constitution of ERTs 
may be expanded to serve as the fact-finding and expert review team of the 
UNFCCC, including for reviewing claims for compensation.  Reformed ERTs 
could be at the forefront of examining claims from AOSIS communities, thereby 
keeping the entire UNFCCC structure more compact, coherent, and less 
fragmented. 
D. Accountability in the Claim Process  
Professor Burkett's proposal that under the CRC framework, governments of 
small island states will file consolidated claims on their citizens’ behalf before 
the CRC raises complex accountability concerns.  This is the question whether 
national governments can be trusted to ensure transparency and accountability 
with respect to collating and presenting climate change claims.  Generally, 
accountability has been described as the obligation to demonstrate that a project 
has been conducted in accordance with agreed rules and standards and to report 
fairly and accurately on performance results vis-à-vis mandated roles or plans.24  
Here, we define accountability in terms of openness and fairness in the process 
of accessing international compensation bodies for damages and reparations 
 
23. See Charlotte Streck & Jolene Lin, Making Markets Work: A Review of CDM Performance and the 
Need for Reform, 19 EUR. J. INT’L L. 409, 409-42 (2008). 
24. ORG. FOR ECON. CO-OPERATION & DEV. [OECD], PUBLIC SECTOR TRANSPARENCY AND 
ACCOUNTABILITY: MAKING IT HAPPEN 7 (2002). 
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resulting from climate-induced slow-onset events.25  It encompasses the 
structural conditions, the processes, and the indicators and outcomes, through 
which the CRC reviews and monitors the practical impacts of climate change on 
the public.  As such, an accountable organization would provide an adequate 
structure to ensure a transparent review, measurement, and monitoring of the 
process leading to the filing of claims before it.  The UN General Assembly, for 
instance, has adopted Resolution 60/260 on Accountability.26  This resolution 
emphasized the importance of strengthened accountability within the United 
Nations and the need for all UN agencies to ensure greater accountability 
within their spheres of operation for the effective and efficient implementation 
of legislative mandates and the best use of human and financial resources.  
Many international treaties have increasingly taken the approach of 
establishing individual complaint procedures that allow private citizens to bring 
an action at an international forum for claims.  Other international 
organizations have also established the Office of the Compliance Advisor or an 
Ombudsperson to receive complaints and comments directly from the public.27  
For example, the World Bank Inspection Panel (WBIP or the “Panel”) receives 
direct claims from private individuals.  
One critique of the current Kyoto Compliance Mechanism and the Clean 
Development Mechanism (CDM) Executive Board (EB) example cited by 
Burkett is that private individuals or members of the public do not have access 
to request a review or submit a question of implementation under the current 
Compliance Rules.28  The CDM EB is undergoing reforms to address a plenitude 
of accountability and transparency concerns; for example, under the CDM, only 
national authorities may request a project review—a situation that has resulted 
in allegations that many national governments only present project review 
requests that they consider compatible with national interests.  This is quite 
restrictive compared to Aarhus, under which a complaint before the Compliance 
 
25. See MICHAEL HAMMER ET AL., ONE WORLD TRUST, PATHWAYS TO ACCOUNTABILITY II: THE 2011 
REVISED GLOBAL ACCOUNTABILITY FRAMEWORK (2011), available at http://oneworldtrust.org/ 
publications/doc_download/470-pathways-to-accountability-ii.  
26. Investing in the United Nations: For a Stronger Organization Worldwide, G.A. Res. 60/260, at 
art. 1, U.N. Doc. A/RES/60/260 (May 8, 2006). 
27. For example, the International Finance Corporation’s Compliance Advisor Ombudsman (CAO) is 
an independent recourse mechanism for projects supported by the International Finance 
Corporation (IFC) and Multilateral Investment Guarantee Agency (MIGA), the private sector 
lending arms of the World Bank Group. The CAO was established in 1999 to address the concerns 
of individuals or communities affected by IFC/MIGA–funded projects, to enhance the social and 
environmental outcomes of IFC/MIGA projects, and to foster greater public accountability of IFC 
and MIGA. See COMPLIANCE ADVISOR OMBUDSMAN, http://www.cao-ombudsman.org (last visited 
Apr. 23, 2013). 
28. Id. 
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Review Mechanism can be triggered by one or more members of the public 
concerning any Party’s compliance with the Convention.29  As of August 2013, 
the Convention’s Compliance Committee has received over 40 communications 
from the public—mostly from non-governmental organizations. 
The accountability of a CRC could be measured in terms of its structural 
conditions, processes, and outcomes.30  Structural conditions measure the 
availability of relevant legal and institutional frameworks that make it possible 
to attain the goals of the institution, in this case the CRC.  It would include the 
availability of rules and safeguards that prevent governmental secrecy and 
unfairness, as well as the establishment of relevant institutions to monitor and 
enforce such rules.  At the international level, this speaks to the need to ensure 
that reparations and claims are not influenced by governmental interests or 
pressure. Process measures how established regimes and structures are 
functioning in practice, whether they merely exist on paper or actually possess 
the tools and capacity to ensure goal attainment.  As such, it is not enough to 
establish a CRC—its processes of admitting claims must be pragmatically 
designed to ensure that it achieves its ultimate aims and goals.  While 
establishing such review structures, part of the task is to ensure their 
accessibility and independence.  Filing claims through intermediaries and 
agents, such as governments and national authorities, would reduce 
accessibility and independence.  This aside, such review teams must be 
equipped with the resources to perform spot assessments, fact findings, and 
investigations, such that they could gather first-hand information on the true 
impacts of climate change on the public.  Despite debates on its perceived 
weaknesses, the Panel provides a good example in this regard.31  WBIP adopts a 
 
29.  [C]ommunications may be brought before the Committee by one or more members of 
the public concerning any Party’s compliance with the Convention, unless that Party 
has notified the Depositary in writing by the end of the applicable period that it is 
unable to accept, for a period of not more than four years, the consideration of such 
communications by the Committee. 
 Rep. of the 1st Mtg. of the Parties to the Convention on Access to Info., Public Participation in 
Decision-Making and Access to Justice in Envt’l Matters, ¶¶ 18-24, U.N. Doc. ECE/MP.PP/2/ 
Add.8 (Apr. 2, 2004). 
30. The UN Special Rapporteur on the right to health, Paul Hunt, has provided a framework, 
which though not legally binding, could serve as a normative guide on how institutional 
accountability can be measured. He argues that accountability should be measured in terms 
of structural conditions, processes, and outcomes. U.N. Comm’n on Hum. Rts., Interim Report 
of the Special Rapporteur of the Commission on Human Rights on the Right of Everyone to 
Enjoy the Highest Attainable Standard of Physical and Mental Health, Mr Paul Hunt, ¶¶ 14-
29, U.N. Doc. A/58/427 (Oct. 10, 2003). 
31. See Richard E. Bissell, Recent Practice of the Inspection Panel of the World Bank, 91 AM. J. INT’L 
L. 741 (1997); David D. Bradlow, The World Bank, the IMF, and Human Rights, 6 TRANSNAT’L L. 
& CONTEMP. PROBS. 47, 47-90 (1996); Dana L. Clark, The Rise and Fall of Accountability, 6 
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procedure that allows any community or group of individuals affected by a 
project, including NGOs, to approach it for investigations.  The process of 
investigation is triggered by the submission of a request for inspection.  
According to the WBIP Operating Procedures, two or more affected people may 
submit a request.  Similarly, a local organization or other duly appointed 
representative on behalf of the affected people, a foreign organization in 
exceptional circumstances if no local representative is available, or an executive 
director of the World Bank may submit a review request.  A request may be 
submitted in any language and in any format, including by a mere letter, except 
that it must be in writing, dated and signed by the requesters.32  The Panel also 
respects the confidentiality of requesters who ask that their names not be 
published.  According to the Panel’s procedures, a request would be registered 
for further processing unless the Chairperson determines that it is “without 
doubt manifestly outside the Panel’s mandate.”33  The Panel also maintains a 
publicly accessible register of registered requests that is available on its 
website.34  The process established by the WBIP allows members of the public to 
directly file review requests, thereby facilitating accessibility and independence. 
Outcome, the last element, tests whether the structural conditions and 
processes are actually bringing about results in providing compensation and 
reparations for the victims of climate-induced stress.  While the outcome may 
tell us whether human rights are enforced, structural conditions and processes 
tell us how they are enforced. 
When viewed through the lens of structural conditions, processes, and 
outcome, the current frame proposed by Burkett calls for a rethinking if 
transparency and accountability are to be guaranteed in the process of seeking 
compensation and rehabilitation before the CRC.  There is a need to ensure the 
accessibility and independence of the CRC by making it open to private 
individuals and non-governmental organizations that have suffered direct 
impacts of slow-onset events without having to go through national 
governments. 
 
WATERSHED no. 3, 52, 52-55 (2001); Richard E. Bissell, Institutional and Procedural Aspects of the 
Inspection Panel, in THE INSPECTION PANEL OF THE WORLD BANK: A DIFFERENT COMPLAINTS 
PROCEDURE 107 (Gudmundur Alfredsson & Rolf Ring eds., 2001).   
32. Operating Procedure – English, THE INSPECTION PANEL, ¶¶ 6-15, http://web.worldbank.org/ 
WBSITE/EXTERNAL/EXTINSPECTIONPANEL/0,,contentMDK:20175161~menuPK:64129254~
pagePK:64129751~piPK:64128378~theSitePK:380794,00.html#Subject (last visited Nov. 30, 
2014). 
33. Id. at ¶ 22.  
34. See THE INSPECTION PANEL, http://ewebapps.worldbank.org/apps/ip/Pages/Home.aspx (last visited 
Jan. 3, 2015). 
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III. Conclusion 
As Professor Burkett rightly reckons, the practical questions and hurdles that 
a CRC may face along the way are enormous.  This paper has identified and 
discussed four more of these.  The hurdles, however, do not call for intellectual 
surrender.  The proposals for a CRC represent an ingenious approach aimed at 
tackling the impacts of slow-onset events in AOSIS states through a framework 
that indemnifies, compensates, and rehabilitates the injured person for the loss 
suffered.  Through this framework, financial assistance will be provided for the 
most vulnerable victims of slow-onset events to reclaim their futures.  Every 
framework will generally attract its own measure of pessimism and optimism.  
As such, considering the strategic importance of this CRC framework to address 
the question of how sustainable financial instruments may be designed to 
appropriately address loss and damage associated with slow-onset events and 
may be provided for AOSIS states, a forward-looking approach is needed to 
continue to fine-tune the CRC framework to ensure practical questions and 
paradoxes are significantly addressed.  
There is also a need to continue to raise awareness at all levels about why 
this proposal is important to the future of AOSIS states and to global actions on 
climate change.  If the process of international climate change negotiations is 
anything to go by, one key way of ensuring international acceptance of a 
proposal is through sustained awareness at the national level of the need for 
action.  Considering the nature of problems generated by slow-onset events, 
particularly loss of lives, loss of subsistence, and the dislocation of people from 
ancestral lands and homes, it is important to raise awareness on why reforms to 
extant approval processes are not only important, but required.  International 
diplomacy has been largely influenced by the ability of NGOs and 
environmental interest groups to raise awareness and to put pressure on 
national governments to effect change or reform at the international level.35  As 
 
35. Although NGOs are formally only observers at a number of United Nations conferences, 
including climate change conferences (without voting rights and with restricted access to the 
corridors), plenary sessions, and some contact groups, nonetheless, many scholars agree that 
NGOs still make a great difference in global environmental politics. NGOs and interest 
groups have played active roles in putting pressure on international gatekeepers to support 
environmental negotiation processes. One frequently cited example is how Environmental 
NGOs (ENGOs) contributed to drafting the UNFCCC at the Rio Earth Summit in 1992 by 
participating in government delegations, lobbying, building public pressure, and contributing 
to the content and structure of the negotiation text. The influence and role of NGOs in 
international lawmaking therefore cannot be sidelined. NGOs such as Green Peace 
International, Amnesty International, Down to Earth Group, Earth Right, and Earth Justice 
can play extensive roles in creating international awareness of the need to address the human 
rights’ impacts of climate change on small island and low-lying coastal countries. For 
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Sterk rightly notes, international politics do not happen in a vacuum—the 
positions countries take internationally are determined mainly by their 
domestic political situations.36  As such, progress in reforming current 
international climate negotiations to include compensations and rehabilitations 
would be enhanced if pro-climate advocacy coalitions can be brought together in 
key countries and across borders to demand change.  The fear of possible 
backlash from the press or environmental NGOs could elevate the need for 
negotiators to push for reforms.  With an intensive awareness driven by NGOs 
and interest groups, particularly NGOs in developed countries, there could be 
increased pressure on negotiators, policy makers, and international gatekeepers 
to support amendments aimed at addressing the impacts of climate change in 
AOSIS states.  Such awareness drives have enormous potential to culminate in 
the eventual reform and amendment of key provisions of the UNFCCC to 
recognize the unique vulnerabilities of AOSIS states.  They might also succeed 
 
example, Green Peace International and Down to Earth Group have already launched a series 
of projects that highlight these concerns. If stakeholders or government in an AOSIS 
country—say, Cape Verde—can develop a detailed amendment proposal based on some of the 
ideas discussed in this paper and seek support from these NGOs on the importance of 
compensating and rehabilitating victims of climate change in small island and low-lying 
coastal countries, a coordinated awareness drive would be generated that could result in 
widespread call for countries to support the establishment of a compensation and 
rehabilitation mechanism as part of the global regime on climate. See generally BAS ARTS, 
THE POLITICAL INFLUENCE OF GLOBAL NGOS: CASE STUDIES ON THE CLIMATE AND 
BIODIVERSITY CONVENTIONS (Annemarie Weitsel ed., 1998); SEBASTIAN OBERTHUR ET AL., 
PARTICIPATION OF NON-GOVERNMENTAL ORGANISATIONS IN INTERNATIONAL ENVIRONMENTAL 
GOVERNANCE: LEGAL BASIS AND PRACTICAL EXPERIENCE (2002); Steinar Andresen & Lars H. 
Gulbrandsen, The Role of Green NGOs in Promoting Climate Compliance, in IMPLEMENTING 
THE CLIMATE REGIME: INTERNATIONAL COMPLIANCE 169, 169 (Jon Hovi, Olav Stokke & Geir 
Ulfstein eds., 2005); Michele Betsill, Environmental NGOs and the Kyoto Protocol 
Negotiations: 1995 to 1997, in NGO DIPLOMACY: THE INFLUENCE OF NONGOVERNMENTAL 
ORGANIZATIONS IN INTERNATIONAL ENVIRONMENTAL NEGOTIATIONS 43, 43-66 (Michele Betsill 
&  Elisabeth Corell eds., 2008); Michele Betsill & Elisabeth Corell, A Comparative Look at 
NGO Influence in International Environmental Negotiations: Desertification and Climate 
Change, 1 GLOBAL ENVTL. POL. 86 (2001); Michele Betsill & Elisabeth Corell, NGO Influence 
in International Environmental Negotiations: A Framework for Analysis, 1 GLOBAL ENVTL 
POL. 65 (2001); Chad Carpenter, Businesses, Green Groups and the Media: The Role of Non-
governmental Organizations in the Climate Change Debate, 77 INTL. AFF. 313, 313-28 (2001); 
Kal Raustiala, Nonstate Actors in the Global Climate Regime, in INT’L REL. & GLOBAL 
CLIMATE CHANGE REGIME 95 (Urs Luterbacher & Detlef Sprinz eds., 2001); Katharina Rietig, 
Public Pressure versus Lobbying – How do Environmental NGOs Matter Most in Climate 
Negotiations? (Ctr. for Climate Change Economics and Policy, Working Paper No. 79, 2011). 
36. See Wolfgang Sterk, House Cleaning in Doha: UN Climate Summit Delivers Second Life for Kyoto 
but no Deal to Revive Carbon Market, 1 CARBON MECHANISMS REV. 7 (Jan.–Mar. 2013). The 
author argues that international negotiations can rarely make decisions that have not been 
previously prepared nationally, and that in the current situation, most key countries have no 
appetite to undergo fundamental economic and ecologic transformations under current climate 
change regimes. Id. 
 Proposal for a Climate Compensation Mechanism for Small Island States: Response to Burkett 
149 
in creating more information and re-wakening on the need for more funding 
support for AOSIS states. 
  

